Lafayette Lost First Conversion Ballot; Recount Was Never In Play
Credit Union Times October 17, 2007
By David Morrison
KENSINGTON, Md. — Documents have come to light that suggest the $296 million Lafayette Federal
Credit Union initially lost the ballot on whether or not to convert to a mutual bank charter
and may have prevented a vote recount and certification that could have shown that loss.
The first report on election results had shown supporters of the charter change winning the
contest by 18 votes, the narrowest margin ever in a CU-to-bank charter change election. But
that winning ballot was later decertified and the credit union withdrew its application to
convert its charter.
The documents also suggest that some in the CU's camp were unhappy the credit union's
independent inspector of the election, the accounting firm RSM McGladrey, had contacted NCUA
when it decertified the CU's initial vote count. They also outline, ironically, that it was
an e-mail that the CU sent during the balloting that triggered the investigation into the vote
count in the first place.
McGladrey produced the documents in response to a subpoena from NCUA which is part of an ongoing
investigation into Lafayette's charter change balloting. The agency released the documents as
part of a request under the Freedom of Information Act from Bill Brooks as part of his ongoing
legal fight with the CU.
The documents provide the clearest picture so far of at least one part of what was going on
behind the scenes as Lafayette first appeared to narrowly win the balloting, only to see the
vote decertified and then to announce it was abandoning the charter change attempt.
According to a Feb. 9 letter from McGladrey to NCUA about the balloting controversy, the firm
had initially certified the vote on Dec. 19, 2006 as 2,555 votes for the conversion and 2,537
against, giving proponents the 18 vote majority. But a subsequent recounting of the ballots
seeking to investigate some balloting discrepancies resulted in a count of 2,556 in favor of
the conversion and 2,562 against, giving opponents a victory by six votes, the firm said.
At the time, Lafayette would only blame McGladrey for the discrepancy in the vote count and
asserted that errors by the firm and the closeness of the vote would prevent the CU from ever
really knowing the actual vote count.
"We are deeply disappointed that the integrity of the balloting process has been
irredeemably compromised due to errors by RSM McGladrey in the tabulation process," the
credit union said in the press release at the time. "In the opinion of the Board, these
errors make it impossible to confidently ascertain the will of the membership."
Due to the closeness of the vote and the errors that were made by the inspector of election,
the Board is doubtful that a new third party inspector of election can provide unqualified
certitude to the Board in order for the credit union and its membership to be confident of the
final outcome. As a result, the Board has determined to terminate the Plan of Mutual Charter
Conversion," the CU added at the time.
But the documents suggest that McGladrey believed that a recount of the entire vote was not
only possible but also necessary and that the firm urged the recount on the credit union
several times in the wake of the decertification.
According to McGladrey, the first suggestion for a recount came from Dale Hotz, a managing
director for McGladrey, in a Jan. 5 phone call after the firm had decertified the previous
election results and notified the CU and NCUA about the decertification.
In McGladrey's account, Hotz spoke on the phone with three of Lafayette's lawyers–Richard
Garabedian, Lafayette's lawyer during the conversion process with the Washington, D.C. law
firm of Luse, Gorman, Pomerenk, & Schick and Kent Krudys, with the same firm who had also
been working on the conversion. McGladrey also states that Eric Luse, a principal partner
in the firm, may have also been on the call, but did not say this absolutely.
In McGladrey's account of the call, Hotz said that due to the "closeness of the counts,
the appropriate course of action would be a complete recount of all days." McGladrey
told the agency that it made similar pleas to be allowed to do a recount on Jan. 8 and
Jan. 9.
The firm said that on the Jan. 8 call from Hotz and its in-house council to Lafayette's
counsel and then Lafayette CEO Michael Hearne the firm stressed that "absent a recount,
the extent and impact of the error on the conversion vote cannot be definitely known."
McGladrey did not speculate on why Lafayette ultimately refused to allow a recount, but the
firm's statement on the events said its in-house council remembered Krudys from the Jan. 8
phone call as saying, in regard to a recount, that "Lafayette may not want to know the
results." But the firm added that the counsel "believes but is not sure" that
Krudy's said this.
Garabedian has not responded to a request for comment on McGladrey's account of the press
calls as of press time.
The firm's account of the ballot counting problem also did not offer any explanation on
how the original miscount had occurred, but it did contain a detailed account of how it had
been discovered.
On Nov. 3, 2006 Lafayette sent an e-mail to some of its members who worked at the U.S. Small
Business Administration which, the agency contended, had violated some of its disclosure
regulations and "improperly implied that NCUA has endorsed Lafayette's conversion
materials." The CU has specified that it had not necessarily agreed with NCUA's position
on the e-mail but agreed to send a "curative" or clarifying e-mail on Nov. 16.
Now this was during part of the time when the CU was collecting votes from its members on the
conversion question and the agency asked both about the possibility that some of the members
who voted yes during the Nov. 3 – Nov. 16 time period did so because of the CU's e-mail and
the fact that the CU's account of the number of votes during that period did not tally with
the number of votes during the same period it had reported earlier. The investigation into
the discrepancy is what uncovered the missing 32 "no" votes that led the firm to
decertify the vote.
McGladrey has remained quiet on the question of the Lafayette balloting since it decertified
the vote and made a request of NCUA not to make these documents eligible for release under the
Freedom of Information Act, but these documents coming to light have left some questions on
the table.
Loose Ends Still Dangling
For example, during the Jan. 9 phone call McGladrey recalled Lafayette's counsel being upset
that the firm had notified NCUA that it decertified the vote. In the firm's account of the
phone call, McGladrey said Lafayette's counsel "expresses unhappiness that RSM contacted
the NCUA directly." The law firm has not yet responded to inquiries about why it had been
unhappy that the agency had been notified of the certification.
Likewise, the brokerage firm of Sandler O'Neil has not yet commented on McGladrey's report that
one of its principals, Louis Parr, contacted Hotz on Aug. 14 regarding the Lafayette voting.
In the firm's statement Hotz said Parr contacted him by phone about "encoding ballots and
the mailing process" and Hotz told him that McGladrey had no role in the mailing other than
collecting and tabulating the returned ballots.
The firm also reported that it had not tracked the ballots which the CU delivered directly for
tabulation but recalled at least one occasion when Lafayette executive Juan Marulanda hand
delivered ballots prior to the Special Meeting on the conversion and another occasion where
the CU forwarded ballots by mail.
—dmorrison@cutimes.com
© 2007, Used with permission from The Credit Union
Times. All rights reserved.
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